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Article 
Deleveraging the American Homeowner:  
The Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract 
Modifications 
ALAN M. WHITE 
The subprime foreclosure crisis has resulted in residential mortgage debt burdens far beyond 
what borrowers can repay.  Many economists have recognized the need to deleverage the American 
homeowner.   Empirical evidence from mortgage servicer reports to investors show that for the most 
part, the necessary deleveraging of homeowners is not happening.  This Article reports on a study of 
data from more than 3.5 million subprime and alt-A mortgages, including about one-sixth of all 
foreclosures pending, and about 20% of the monthly total modifications in November 2008.  The key 
findings are the following: (1) modifications are not reducing principal debt, they are increasing it.  
Almost no modifications include significant cancellation of either past due interest or principal, and 
many modifications involve capitalizing unpaid interest and fees and reamortizing the loan, which 
occurred in 68% of loan modifications.  Some principal was canceled, and reported as a partial loss, 
for about 10% of modifications; (2) servicers are incurring huge losses for investors by foreclosing.  
The average foreclosure loss on a first mortgage in November 2008 was $145,000 or about 55% of the 
average amount due.  Loss severities increased steadily throughout 2007 and 2008 and are expected to 
worsen in 2009.  In these circumstances, rational investors should accept mortgage principal 
reductions corresponding to home value declines of 20% or so, were it not for the various obstacles to 
servicers’ restructuring of mortgage loans; (3) fewer than half of voluntary mortgage modifications 
reduced monthly payment burdens; (4) the variations among servicers in the number and quality of 
modifications are enormous.  This variation suggests that not every servicer is doing the maximum 
possible to reach and work out terms with every defaulted borrower; (5) many modifications are 
temporary.  For example, some adjusted interest rate and amortization terms were only for five years, 
with rate and payment increases after five years.  Servicers also use balloon payments and other forms 
of deferrals in order to reduce payments without reducing total debt.  Thus, the totals reported by the 
industry include many loans that are being modified to include deferred payment shocks, negative 
amortization or other non-amortizing features of the sort that caused the foreclosure crisis; and (6) 
significant numbers of mortgage loans are seriously delinquent, but not in a modification program or 
in foreclosure. The foreclosure crisis is overwhelming the ability of servicers to either restructure or 
foreclose on all the delinquent loans.   
The Article discusses the many reasons why necessary mortgage restructuring is not happening 
and proposes several policy responses. 
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Deleveraging the American Homeowner:   
The Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract 
Modifications 
ALAN M. WHITE∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION: DELEVERAGING MORTGAGE BORROWERS AS A 
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM 
The subprime foreclosure crisis of 2007 was precipitated by the rapid 
increase in defaults and foreclosures on subprime mortgage loans to 
homeowners in the United States.1  The actual and anticipated losses from 
these mortgage loans caused dramatic declines in the value of mortgage-
backed securities that were issued to fund subprime and alt-A mortgages, 
as well as direct losses to banks that held mortgage loans directly.  As of 
October 2008, the International Monetary Fund estimates that financial 
institutions will write down $85 billion of subprime and alt-A mortgages 
on their own books, while the various holders of mortgage-backed 
securities and derivative securities will write down $500 billion as a result 
of losses.2  Adding corporate debt, prime and commercial mortgage losses 
and all other categories, world-wide financial losses are estimated at $1.4 
trillion.3  While there were obviously weaknesses in these other debt 
markets, the subprime mortgage losses hit first and triggered the broader 
credit crisis. 
Although financial institutions and other investors have recognized 
mortgage-related losses and embarked on an unprecedented deleveraging 
process,4 most of the underlying mortgages remained on the shoulders of 
American homeowners by the end of 2008.  Aggregate U.S. home 
mortgage debt had not declined a year and a half into the crisis, despite 
having reached clearly unsustainable levels.  The process of foreclosing 
defaulted mortgages and reselling homes at lower prices (thus substituting 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Assistant Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law 
1 For an excellent timeline of the crisis of 2007–2009 with links to stories on each key event, see 
Posting of Edward Harrison to Credit Writedowns, http://www.creditwritedowns.com/credit-crisis-
timeline#Timeline (Nov. 20, 2008). 
2 Int’l Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Financial Stress and Deleveraging: 
Macrofinancial Implications and Policy 15, tbl.1.1 (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/02/index.htm. 
3 Id. 
4 See id. at 18–25 (noting that the deleveraging of banks involves recognizing losses, writing 
down loans and securities on bank balance sheets, reducing exposure to additional risk and injecting 
new capital). 
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smaller mortgages for larger ones) was the only deleveraging that 
occurred.  Foreclosure liquidations increased monthly and reached about 
one hundred thousand per month at the end of 2008,5 resulting in a total of 
nearly one million foreclosures during that year.6  While the average loss 
per property in November was roughly $124,000,7 much of that was from 
unpaid interest.  The deleveraging of homeowners would be represented 
only by the difference in mortgage debt between the failed mortgage and 
the new purchaser’s mortgage amount.  While it is difficult to estimate the 
net mortgage debt reduction resulting from this process, it was clearly less 
than $100 billion. 
The difference between the annual foreclosure-induced debt reduction 
for homeowners of less than $100 billion and the $500 billion in expected 
financial losses from mortgages was the unresolved excess leverage of the 
American homeowner at the end of 2008.  This missing write-down 
represents mortgages that were still outstanding but not expected to be 
paid.  Home mortgage debt grew faster than the ability of homeowners to 
service it throughout the decade preceding the crisis, and especially from 
2004 to 2007.  By the end of the third quarter of 2008, there were nearly 
six million mortgages delinquent or in foreclosure,8 and fourteen million 
homeowners are projected to have mortgage debt exceeding the value of 
their property.9 
Given that overleveraging was caused in part by loan structures that 
deferred principal and even interest, further deferrals seem unlikely to 
solve the problem.  Fundamentally, the principal amount of mortgage debt 
in the United States must be reduced in order to bring down delinquency 
and foreclosure levels and stop the erosion in home prices.  This in turn is 
essential for the broader economy both because of the significant role that 
home prices and new home construction play and because of the drag on 
consumer spending imposed by the debt service homeowners cannot 
maintain.10  While there is no consensus on the optimal level of consumer 
or mortgage debt, there is broad agreement that home prices and mortgage 
debt must both be reduced from their 2007 peaks at the height of the 
                                                                                                                          
5 HOPE NOW Loss Mitigation National Data July 2007 to November 2008, http://www. 
hopenow.com/upload/data/files/HOPE%20NOW%20Loss%20Mitigation%20National%20Data%20Jul
y%2007%20to%20November%2008.pdf.    
6 Les Christie, Banks Working to Prevent Foreclosures, CNNMONEY.COM, Jan. 29, 2009, http:// 
money.cnn.com/2009/01/29/real_estate/Hope_Now_foreclosures_easing/index.htm?postversion=20090
12912. 
7 See infra Part III.E (noting that the average loss in November for mortage loans was $124,000). 
8 See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY Q308 
(2008) (reporting about two percent of mortgages in foreclosure and four percent delinquent, in a 
survey of forty-five million mortgages representing eighty percent of all mortgages).  
9 Douglas W. Elmendorf, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Apr. 10, 2008), available at 
http://banking.”senate.gov/public/_files/ElmendorfSenateBankingTestimonyApril112008.pdf. 
10 Id. 
 2009] DELEVERAGING THE AMERICAN HOMEOWNER 1111 
bubble in order to achieve sustainable economic growth.11  Deleveraging 
homeowners is necessary not only for the economy as a whole, but in 
particular to limit losses on existing mortgage debt.  As of this writing, 
eighteen months into the crisis, mortgage industry efforts to restructure 
loans have failed to achieve the necessary deleveraging. 
Mortgage servicers face a classic collective action problem.12  Each 
individual servicer in the face of declining home values wants to foreclose 
on defaulted mortgages as quickly as possible in order to avoid deepening 
losses.  On the other hand, mortgage servicers and investors as a whole 
would maximize returns on defaulted mortgages by halting or slowing the 
addition of unsold homes to the inventory, allowing demand to reach 
equilibrium with supply so that homes could be sold at optimal prices.  
Moreover, the home price decline contributes to unemployment which 
produces more mortgage defaults. 
No single servicer or group of servicers, however, has any economic 
incentive to organize a pause in foreclosures or to organize a deleveraging 
program to benefit the group.13  If a single servicer attempts to compromise 
mortgage debts in order to achieve a better return from a foreclosure sale, 
other servicers who continue foreclosing will benefit as free riders 
incrementally from the servicer’s forbearance or workout because they will 
sell in a market with incrementally fewer foreclosed properties.  Moreover, 
the servicer engaged in more aggressive modifications will face short-run 
resistance from investors.14  Reinforcing the collective action problem are 
various contractual and legal barriers to renegotiation of mortgage debt.15  
The empirical evidence presented below confirms that a year and a half 
into the subprime crisis the mortgage industry has been unable to achieve 
                                                                                                                          
11 DEAN BAKER, THE KEY TO STABILIZING HOUSE PRICES: BRING THEM DOWN (2008), available 
at http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/the-key-to-stabilizing-house-prices:-bring-them-
down; Martin Feldstein, How To Help People Whose Home Values Are Underwater, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
18, 2008, at A21, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File. 
12 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 5–8 (1971) (“One purpose that is . . . characteristic of most organzations, and 
surely of practically all organizations with an important economic aspect, is the furtherance of the 
interests of their members.”); TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 
(1992) (“Collective action arises when the efforts of two or more individuals are needed to accomplish 
an outcome.  Activities that involve the furtherance of the interests or well-being of a group are often 
examples of collective action.”). 
13 Sebastian Mallaby, Paulson Behind the Curve, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2007, at A19, available 
at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File. 
14 See Gretchen Morgenson, Assurances on Buyback May Cost a Lender, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23 
2007, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (“[S]ervic[ers] . . . may have less incentive 
to help troubled borrowers who are interested in working out their loans . . . because doing so could put 
the parent company on the hook to buy back a loan.”). 
15 Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s “Preventive Servicing Is Good for 
Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy”: What Prevents Loan Modifications?, 18 HOUSING 
POL’Y DEB. 279, 288–90, 292 (2007); see also Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by 
Mortgage Servicers, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEB. 753, 760–61, 774–75 (2004) (discussing the behavior of 
servicers toward borrowers and the laws regulating such action). 
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efficient and equitable deleveraging of American homeowners. 
II.  STUDY METHOD AND STATUS OF MORTGAGES 
This Article extends my prior study of voluntary modifications in 
subprime loan pools16 by looking at a much larger database of 3.5 million 
subprime and alt-A loans known as the Columbia Collateral File.17  This 
larger database permits more reliable analysis of mortgage modification 
and foreclosure behavior by a broad range of servicers.  In addition, 
beginning with the November 25, 2008 report, the Columbia Collateral 
File added fourteen additional variables describing modification 
agreements according to their type.  These new reports allow investors to 
learn, for example, whether mortgage modifications are temporary or 
permanent, whether and to what extent interest is being forgiven or 
postponed, and whether adjustable rate or interest-only loans are being 
converted to fixed rate or amortizing loans.  These data confirm that 
voluntary modifications are generally increasing rather than reducing 
mortgage debt and are not consistently reducing payment burdens, and that 
foreclosures are resulting in extremely high loss severities.  The new data 
also offer additional important insights into the actions of servicers in 
response to massive loan defaults, discussed below.18 
The Columbia Collateral File is released monthly.  For this Article I 
looked at the files for January, October, November, and December of 
2008.19  The 3.5 million mortgages in the November database are all 
                                                                                                                          
16 Alan M. White, Rewriting Contracts Wholesale: Evidence from Mortgage Remittance Reports, 
36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2009). 
17 The Columbia Collateral File contains current month performance data for alt-A and subprime 
mortgage pools that have been securitized, and for which Wells Fargo Corporate Trust Services serves 
as trustee.  Wells Fargo Corporate Trust Services, http://www.ctslink.com (containing links to investor 
report files) (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).  For purposes of this study, subprime is defined as loans that 
do not conform to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac underwriting standards and are priced above the higher-
cost loan threshold for reporting under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. See 12 C.F.R. § 
203.4(a)(12) (2009) (describing reporting standards under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act).  Alt-A 
refers to loans that are below the subprime price levels and are securitized privately, i.e., not by the 
government-sponsored entities (GSEs).  Alt-A loans typically are loans made to borrowers with higher 
credit scores but with less income documentation than required by GSEs or with negative amortization 
or other product features not offered by GSEs.  Many of the subprime loans in the database were made 
to borrowers with “prime” credit scores: for first lien adjustable-rate mortgages, 24% of subprime loans 
reflected FICO scores above 650.  See Wells Fargo Corporate Trust Services, supra (containing links to 
the Columbia Collateral File database).   
18 Wells Fargo Corporate Trust Services, supra note 17.  The data reported in this Article can be 
downloaded from Wells Fargo Corporate Trust Services, supra note 17 (after registering with the web 
site) as fixed-field text files.  The data dictionary can be downloaded from the site as well.  The 
resulting data may be analyzed using a statistical software package such as SPSS (which I used), SAS 
or STATA.   
19 For convenience I excluded the relatively small number of mortgages securitized before 2000.  
The Columbia Collateral Files for loan deals securitized in 2000 through 2007 were combined and 
analyzed using SPSS for Mac and Excel.  All statistics reported in this Article are based on the author’s 
calculations. 
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privately securitized and represent one-third to one-half of subprime and 
alt-A mortgages, about 7% of all U.S. mortgages.  Included are 233,000 
mortgages in foreclosure and 69,000 in bankruptcy, a total of about 
300,000.  This compares with about 1.8 million foreclosures as of 
September 30, 2008,20 so the database includes about one-sixth of all 
mortgages in foreclosure. 
About 29% of the mortgages in the file were delinquent on November 
25, 2008 (36% for adjustable rate mortgages).  This is higher than the 
national rate for all mortgages and reflects the subprime and alt-A 
composition of the database.  Most of the mortgages modified (93%) were 
first lien mortgages.  Modifications were concentrated in the subprime (as 
opposed to alt-A) portion of the mortgages: 88% of modified loans were 
subprime, compared with 43% of unmodified loans.21  To look at it another 
way, 1.4% of all subprime loans were modified in a single month, 
compared with 0.1% of alt-A loans.  This can be explained in part because 
only 44% of the adjustable rate subprime loans are still current, compared 
with 80.3% of the adjustable alt-A loans, while 28.5% of subprime ARM 
loans are more than 180 days past due, compared with 9% of alt-A ARMs.  
III.  VOLUNTARY MORTGAGE MODIFICATIONS ARE NOT REDUCING, BUT 
ARE IN FACT INCREASING, MORTGAGE DEBT 
The new data confirm and update my prior findings.22  Most voluntary 
modifications result in increasing debt, by capitalizing unpaid interest, and 
little interest or principal is being forgiven.  More than half of modification 
agreements still increase monthly payments rather than reduce them.  The 
variation in intensity and aggressiveness of modifications among servicers 
continues, while loss severities on completed foreclosures continue to 
mount. 
For the November 2008 monthly reporting period, there were 21,219 
mortgage modifications reported.  The HOPE NOW coalition estimated 
there were 103,000 modifications industry-wide in the month of October,23 
so the Columbia Collateral File sample represents about one fifth of all 
modifications.24  Most loans that were modified had been delinquent in the 
                                                                                                                          
20 Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Nat’l Delinquency Survey Q3 (2008). 
21 These figures are based on the adjustable-rate mortgages with data on the margin for 
calculating the adjustable interest rate (1.9 million of the 3.6 million), and defining subprime as 
margins exceeding 4% over the index, a somewhat less-inclusive definition than the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act high-cost loan definition.  See supra text accompanying note 17 (describing the more-
inclusive definition of subprime). 
22 White, supra note 16 (reporting on mortgage modifications in the period July 2007 through 
June 2008). 
23 See HOPE NOW Industy Data, http://www.hopenow.com/industry_data.html (last visited Feb. 
13, 2009) (reporting mortgage loss mitigation statistics). 
24 The 100,000 monthly modifications can be compared with the nearly 200,000 monthly 
foreclosure filings, 1.8 million mortgages in foreclosure and 3 million seriously delinquent mortgages 
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prior month’s report: about 21% were current prior to modification, 68% 
were delinquent by more than 60 days and 50% were more than 120 days 
delinquent.  On the other hand, only 23% of the modified loans had been in 
foreclosure, bankruptcy or REO (real estate owned, i.e. properties already 
foreclosed but not yet sold) prior to modification, so the typical modified 
loan was seriously delinquent, but had not yet been referred for foreclosure 
action, a growing category whose implications I will revisit in a later 
section.  
A.  Most Modifications Increase Debt 
More than two-thirds (68%) of modifications reported in November 
2008 capitalized unpaid interest and/or fees by adding them to the 
outstanding balance.  These loan increases are accounted as negative 
prepayments, i.e. they have the opposite effect as an unscheduled principal 
payment by the borrower.  In 44% of modifications, the amount capitalized 
was more than $5,000.  The average capitalized amount was $10,800 per 
mortgage out of an average balance of $225,000.  A total of $165,000,000 
was added to the total balance due on 21,219 modified loans.  
Extrapolating these numbers to the entire mortgage market, we can 
estimate that a bit less than $1 billion was added to outstanding principal 
mortgage debt in a single month by voluntary modifications.  
In addition, a considerable number of modifications involved deferral 
of unpaid interest and/or principal and conversion of that amount into a 
balloon payment.  One way servicers reduce monthly payments while not 
writing off unpaid interest and advances for legal fees is to reamortize the 
current principal while converting unpaid interest and advances to a 
balloon payment due at the end of the term.  This is another device that 
focuses on the immediate monthly payment cash flow problem, while 
leaving homeowners with negative equity.  The FDIC’s standard loan 
modification approach relies on balloon payments, characterized as 
deferred principal, in order to achieve payment reductions without actually 
writing down principal mortgage debt.25  One thousand five hundred of the 
21,200 modifications reported in November featured a balloon payment.  
Nearly all of the balloon payments (90%) had due dates more than twenty 
years in the future, so, by and large, the balloon feature was used as a way 
to defer unpaid amounts to the end of the loan term. 
                                                                                                                          
at the end of the third quarter of 2008.  HOPE NOW Industry Data, supra note 23 (supplying data 
regarding monthly foreclosure filings); Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, supra note 20 (reporting mortgages in 
foreclosure and delinquent mortgage statistics). 
25 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CO., FDIC LOAN MODIFICATION PROGRAM 8–9 (2008), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/loans/loanmod/FDICLoanMod.pdf (describing the FDIC’s loan 
modification methodology). 
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B.  Debt Writedowns Occur in a Very Small Portion of Modifications, and 
Are Done by Only a Few Servicers 
Mortgage modifications are widely viewed as partial debt cancellation, 
and therefore as likely to create moral hazard issues.26  The fear is that 
borrowers not in default will stop making payments to benefit from what 
are perceived to be generous restructuring terms.  In fact, more than nine 
out of ten voluntary mortgage modifications in 2008 involved no 
cancellation of principal, past-due interest or even late fees or expenses.  
The typical modification requires the homeowner to capitalize unpaid 
amounts or to convert them to a balloon payment.  If the modifications 
being offered were better understood, it is unlikely that they would create 
much of a moral hazard effect among other mortgage borrowers. 
A very small percentage of November 2008 modifications involved 
reported forgiveness of interest, and only seven of the forty-three servicers 
reporting modifications reported significant interest forgiveness (see Table 
1).  This may in part be due to spotty reporting, but it is not surprising to 
see that the two servicers most engaged in reducing principal, Litton and 
Ocwen, are also reporting significant numbers of loans with past-due 
interest forgiven.  In all, about 8% of modified loans had reported interest 
write-offs greater than one monthly payment.  In the remainder of 
modifications where homeowners owed unpaid interest, the interest was 
apparently deferred or capitalized. 
 
Table 1 
Interest written off > Current P&I 
Servicer 
Frequen
cy 
Perc
ent 
Cumulati
ve Percent 
EMC MORTGAGE CORPORATION 1 0.1 0.1 
GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC 10 0.6 0.7 
LITTON LOAN SERVICING 675 42.0 42.7 
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC 890 55.4 98.1 
RESIDENTIAL CREDIT 
SOLUTIONS, INC 5 0.3 98.4 
SAXON MORTGAGE SERVICES, 
INC. 24 1.5 99.9 
SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING 
LLC 1 0.1 100.0 
Total (out of 21,184 November 08 
mods) 1606 
100.
0 
 
                                                                                                                          
26 E.g., David Reilly, New Bailout Again Raises Moral Hazard, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2008, at 
C18, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (“The danger is that loan holders who otherwise 
could meet their payments would decide to fall behind to get their cut of the bailout.”). 
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Modifications with a write-down of principal or interest can also be 
identified based on the servicer reporting a recognized loss.  About 10% 
(2,147) of the modifications reported in November were associated with a 
recognized loss of $1,000 or more (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2  
Modifications with loss > $1,000 
Servicer 
Frequenc
y Percent 
AURORA LOAN SERVICES LLC 49 2.3 
BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC 88 4.1 
CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, 
LLC 1 0.0 
EMC MORTGAGE CORPORATION 1 0.0 
GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC 9 0.4 
HOME LOAN SERVICES, INC. 9 0.4 
LITTON LOAN SERVICING 1,011 47.1 
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC 942 43.9 
OPTION ONE 4 .2 
PAUL FINANCIAL, LLC 1 .0 
RESIDENTIAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS, INC 1 .0 
SAXON MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC. 23 1.1 
SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING,INC 1 .0 
SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING LLC 1 .0 
WILSHIRE CREDIT CORP 4 .2 
Total (out of 21,184 November 08 mods) 2,145 100.0 
 
In the November Columbia Collateral file about 1,100 modified loans 
were reported with principal forgiveness amounts, about 1,900 had interest 
forgiveness amounts reported, and about 900 had expenses forgiven and 
reported.  The total of 2,145 (roughly 10% of modifications) with reported 
losses represent some combination of write-offs in those three categories.  
Thus, in 90% or more of the modifications, there is no forgiveness of past-
due interest, expenses, or principal reported. 
C.  Most Voluntary Mortgage Modifications Did Not Reduce Monthly 
Payment Burdens 
Payment stress is relieved in only about half of all modifications. 
Comparing the initial monthly payment and current monthly payment for 
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all mortgages reported modified in November, 47% showed a reduced 
monthly payment, 18% showed an unchanged payment, and 35% showed 
an increased payment.  This is consistent with the results of my smaller 
survey for the prior twelve-month period.27  Despite the increasing 
attention to reducing payment burdens,28 many servicers remained 
unwilling, at the end of 2008, to make sufficient reductions in interest rates 
to offset the capitalization of arrears.  Indeed, only 53% of November 
modifications reduced the interest rate by more than 1%, nearly one in 
three modified loans still bore interest at a rate above 8%, and the mean 
rate after modification was 6.9%, all of this in a market where the 
conventional mortgage rate was below 6%.29 
D.  The Extent and Types of Voluntary Mortgage Modifications Vary 
Widely among Different Mortgage Servicing Companies 
Servicers vary widely in their voluntary modification activity.  The 
same variations observed in a small sample of nine servicers and 100,000 
mortgages were found among modifications in a pool of 3.5 million 
mortgages managed by eighty different servicers (see Table 3).  
Modifications for the month ranged from a negligible fraction of none for 
forty-seven servicers to 35% of all mortgages in foreclosure for one 
servicer.  Payment reductions ranged from 9% to 89% of modifications.  
Interest or principal write-offs were found in 42% of one servicer’s 
modifications (Litton), but were non-existent for most servicers. 
 
Table 3: November 2008 Modifications by Servicers  
 Total 
Mods 
&of Mods 
w/ Pmt 
Reduced % 
% with 
>$1000 
writeoff 
Mods/ 
FC 
Accredited Home Lenders, 
Inc.  
18 61.1% 0.0% 3.24% 
American Home Mortgage 
Servicing, Inc.  
96  7.3% 0.0% 1.47% 
Aurora Loan Services LLC 1729 44.1% 2.7% 7.13% 
Bank of America, N.A. 11 18.2% 0.0% 0.48% 
Bayview Loan Servicing, 
LLC 
294 23.8% 27.7% 7.71% 
Carrington Mortgage 
Services, LLC 
1332 76.6% 0.1% 35.13% 
                                                                                                                          
27 See White, supra note 16 (describing relevant changes in mortgage payments during a twelve-
month period from July 2007 to June 2008). 
28 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CO., supra note 25, at 5–6 (explaining the philosophical focus of loan 
modification as a means to relieve payment pressures among mortgage borrowers). 
29 E.g., FED. RESERVE BOARD, STAT. RELEASE H.15 (Dec. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/20081201/ (listing the conventional mortgage rate for Nov. 
28, 2008 as 5.97%). 
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 Total 
Mods 
&of Mods 
w/ Pmt 
Reduced % 
% with 
>$1000 
writeoff 
Mods/ 
FC 
Central Mortgage 209 57.9% 0.0% 16.10% 
Chase Home Finance, LLC 437 44.6% 0.0% 7.45% 
Citi Residential Lending, 
Inc. 
36 30.6% 0.0% 3.47% 
CitiMortgage, Inc. 12 16.7% 0.0% 3.25% 
Countrywide Home Loans 
Servicing LP 
579 17.5% 0.0% 3.20% 
EMC Mortgage Corp. 1168 48.9% 0.1% 9.47% 
Everhome Mortgage Co. 20 25.0% 0.0% 3.01% 
GMAC Mortgage, LLC 71 67.6% 11.3% 1.52% 
Home Loan Services, Inc. 179 11.7% 4.8% 7.25% 
HomeQ Servicing Corp. 117 71.8% 0.0% 1.54% 
IINDYMAC Bank, F.S.B. 9 88.9% 0.0% 0.31% 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N.A. 
76 42.1% 0.0% 28.00% 
Litton Loan Servicing 2318 44.7% 41.8% 10.03% 
M&T Mortgage Corp. 10 10.0% 0.0% 9.61% 
Nationstar Mortgage LLC 114 85.1% 0.0% 0.28% 
Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC 2942 53.4% 27.0% 13.29% 
Option One 5005 46.8% 0.1% 19.11% 
Popular Mortgage Servicing 
Inc.  
141  0.7% 0.0% 0.99% 
Regions Mortgage Inc.  16 68.8% 0.0% 4.88% 
Residential Credit 
Solutions, Inc.  
18 50.0% 5.6% 7.08% 
Saxon Mortgage Services 
Inc.  
347 46.7% 6.1% 5.30% 
Select Portfolio Servicing 
Inc.  
92 12.0% 1.1% 3.07% 
Specialized Loan Servicing 
LLC 
11 54.5% 9.1% 3.05% 
Suntrust Mortgage, Inc.  36 33.3% 0.0% 12.20% 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 1159 12.9% 0.0% 0.41% 
Wilshire Credit Corp. 460 35.9% 0.8% 3.12% 
Total (excluding mods with 
missing data or by servicers 
with fewer than 8 mods) 
19112 45.3% 10.1% 18.83% 
 
While there were some relevant differences among servicers, none 
could explain the wide variation in modification activity.  Some servicers 
were predominantly managing subprime pools, while others mostly 
handled alt-A pools, with lower levels of defaults and accordingly of 
modifications as well.  On the other hand, comparing modifications to 
foreclosures is a rough control for that difference, and the variations 
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remain striking.  The variation among servicers is an important finding in 
itself, in that it reveals the ad hoc and uncoordinated nature of the entire 
2007–2008 mortgage restructuring process.  It also strongly suggests that 
not every servicer is modifying mortgages in the most effective way nor 
restructuring every salvageable mortgage loan.  Indeed, the variation 
suggests the opposite: many preventable foreclosures were not prevented. 
E.  Severe Foreclosure Loss Rates Continue Increasing 
Losses on foreclosures continue to be large, exceeding 50%.  The 
average loss in November for all mortgage loans with losses was $124,000, 
on an average loan size of $212,000—a 57% loss.  About one-tenth of 1% 
of the mortgages in the pool (30,816) had losses in November (excluding 
the small portion of modified loans that had write-downs treated as losses).  
However, about 6,800 of the unmodified mortgages with losses were 
second lien mortgages.  The average loss for the 21,000 first mortgages 
liquidated in November was $145,000, representing an average loss of 
55% of the amount due.  Losses on second lien mortgages were close to 
100%. 
In comparison, for the modified loans with some amount of principal 
or interest written off, the average loss recognized was $23,610.  The 
average loss across all modifications was of course much lower, given how 
few modifications involved any write-offs.30  This seven-to-one difference 
between foreclosure losses and modification write-offs is striking, and lies 
at the heart of the failure of the voluntary mortgage modification program.  
Particularly for foreclosed loans with losses above the 57% average, some 
of which approach 100%, the decisions of servicers to foreclose is 
mystifying.  Certainly, some properties are not occupied, are owned by 
investors unwilling to pay any mortgage debt, or otherwise must be 
foreclosed.  There is probably no good empirical test to determine exactly 
how many of these wasteful foreclosure sales could have been avoided, but 
the inference is strong that servicers are not fully mitigating losses.  At a 
minimum, there is room for servicers to be more generous in writing down 
debt for the loans they are modifying, while still recovering far more than 
from foreclosures in the depressed real estate market of late 2008.  I will 
consider some of the reasons for this apparently irrational behavior in a 
later section. 
                                                                                                                          
30 See supra Part III.B (“In all, about 8% of modified loans had reported interest write-offs greater 
than one monthly payment.”). 
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IV.  ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
A.  Not Modified, but Not Foreclosed:  Informal Forbearance 
The reluctance to modify mortgages is explained in part by concerns 
about the importance of contractual obligations, and in part by the need to 
prevent homeowners from believing that they can default on loan 
obligations without consequences.  It is perhaps surprising then to see that 
servicers are allowing about one in seven extremely delinquent borrowers 
to remain in default without being foreclosed.  
While there were 15,500 loans modified in October 2008 in the 
database, and 21,100 in November, there were 420,000 mortgages that 
were more than 180 days past due in the November file.  And while about 
one-third of those were REO and about half are in foreclosure or 
bankruptcy, a remarkable 64,900 mortgages are in serious default, but the 
servicer is not taking legal action to enforce them.  If we expand the 
seriously delinquent category to include 120-day delinquencies, a point at 
which servicers normally would have started foreclosure, there are nearly 
127,000 defaulted mortgage contracts not being enforced, about eight 
times as many as are being modified each month.  In fact, in the 120- to 
180-day delinquent category, the odds are less than 50/50 that a foreclosure 
has been started.  Who are these lucky deadbeats? 
A closer examination of the defaulters with no foreclosure reveals 
some of the factors at play.  About 30% of the defaulted loans not in 
foreclosure were second lien mortgages, compared with 8% of all loans.  
Junior lien mortgages are unlikely to have much, if any, foreclosure value 
in the current declining home value environment, so it is not surprising that 
servicers would refrain from foreclosing them.  About 12% of mortgages 
in default but not in foreclosure had initial loan-to-value ratios above 95%, 
compared with 5.6% for all loans.  About 70% of non-enforced defaults are 
subprime, compared with about 43% of all loans in the database.  
However, while some non-enforcement may be rational given these 
factors, a considerable amount of the non-enforcement on defaulted 
mortgage contracts is due to servicers being overwhelmed and simply 
unable to handle the volume.31 
Moreover, even the 200,000 or so foreclosures in the Columbia 
Collateral file are not all cases where the servicer is actively seeking to 
recover the property.  According to HOPE NOW data, the number of new 
foreclosure filings is outpacing the number of monthly foreclosure sales by 
about two to one,32 meaning that servicers are not selling about half the 
                                                                                                                          
31 Bob Ivry, Lenders Swamped by Foreclosures Let Homeowners Stay, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 
4, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aOluOO8Vy0gc&refer=home. 
32 HOPE NOW Indsutry Data, supra note 23. 
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homes that have been referred for foreclosure proceedings.  In other words, 
in many cases foreclosures are being started but not pursued to sale.  
Combining the defaulted loans not in foreclosure with the foreclosures not 
being brought to sale, one could reasonably extrapolate that more than a 
million mortgages are in formal or informal forbearance of some kind. 
B.  Modification Agreements:  Temporary vs. Permanent 
Fourteen percent of November modifications reported a change in the 
next payment adjustment date.  Of those, 9% had modified rate adjustment 
dates in twelve months or less, 17% in twelve to twenty-four months, 43% 
in twenty-four to thirty-six months, 19% from thirty-six to sixty months, 
and the remaining 12% from five to ten years.  Thus, the majority of 
postponements for payment resets were for three years or less.  Because of 
the very limited reporting on this aspect, it is difficult to know how many 
other modifications were temporary or permanent.  The November 
collateral file also contained a field to flag temporary modifications, but it 
was blank for more than 75% of cases.33  For those reporting, there were 
about four times as many permanent modifications as temporary 
modifications.  State regulators report that about three times as many 
modifications were permanent as temporary, but data were missing on 40% 
of modifications.34  It is difficult to reach any conclusions about either the 
relative share of temporary versus permanent mortgage rewrites, or about 
any trend.  The December 2008 FDIC modification program, which if 
anything is more aggressive than the practices of most servicers, calls for 
interest rate concessions below current market levels to expire in five years 
at most, although it does encourage permanent conversion of adjustable 
rates to fixed.35 
C.  Adjustable-Rate to Fixed-Rate 
Most modified mortgages (71%) were adjustable-rate before being 
modified.36  Many of the modified ARMs were rapidly approaching their 
first adjustment date: fifty-seven percent of modified ARMs had their first 
interest adjustment date falling between October 2008 and June 2009, i.e. 
in the nine-month period beginning just before the reporting period.  
Clearly, looming rate resets were a significant factor in determining which 
                                                                                                                          
33 The December 2008 file “Temporary Modification” field was blank for 81% of cases. 
34 STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION WORKING GROUP, ANALYSIS OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE 
SERVICING PERFORMANCE: DATA REPORT NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 2008, at 9 (2008), available at 
http://www.csbs.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Home/SFPWGReport3.pdf. 
35 FDIC LOAN MODIFICATION PROGRAM, supra note 25, at 3, 5, 9. 
36 Data on ARM-to-fixed conversion are more robust in the December 2008 collateral file, from 
which these summary statistics were calculated.  There were still missing data for 45% of the ARMs in 
the ARM-to-Fixed (Y/N) field.  
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mortgages were modified.  On the other hand, most modified mortgages 
were delinquent before modification, so the looming reset was not the sole 
cause of default.  Two explanations are possible.  It may be that servicers 
chose to focus their efforts both on loans with imminent reset dates and 
loans that are in default as a matter of setting priorities when faced with an 
unmanageable volume of modification requests.  Or it may be that 
borrowers with upcoming reset dates are perceived as more worthy of aid 
despite their having already defaulted. 
Only about one-third of the ARMs were converted to fixed rate 
mortgages, while 14% had reported adjustment rates postponed from one 
to five years.  It is possible that missing data account for some additional 
ARM modifications, but nevertheless, the data indicates that many 
adjustable-rate mortgages, perhaps as many as half, retain their adjustable 
rate nature, with a risk of future payment increases. 
D.  Nontraditional Mortgages:  Interest-Only and Negative Amortization 
Fourteen percent of modified loans had been interest-only initially.  Of 
the modified interest-only mortgages, about one-third were reported as 
having been converted to amortizing loans.  Loans with negative 
amortization, the so-called option-ARMs, predicted to comprise a 
significant number of foreclosures in the 2009 to 2011 period, are not 
being modified in any significant numbers, yet.  Negatively amortizing 
mortgages comprised 9% of all mortgages, 10% of delinquent loans and 
foreclosures, but only 3.6% of modifications in the November Columbia 
file.  Two servicers, Central Mortgage and EMC, accounted for three-
fourths of all the modified negative amortization loans.  These 
nontraditional loans were the subject of particular regulatory concern37 and 
were understood to carry a greater risk of default and foreclosure.38  About 
one-quarter of the modified option-ARMs had rate adjustment dates 
postponed, while the rest retained their original rate adjustment dates.  
One-third were coded as having been converted from amortizing to 
interest-only in the modification data, an odd designation, but perhaps 
meaning that those negative amortizing loans were converted to interest-
only.  That would represent a rather incremental reduction in the future 
payment shock, which will still occur at the end of the interest-only period.  
Despite the knowledge that these particularly dangerous mortgages 
                                                                                                                          
37 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE PRODUCTS: IMPACT ON 
DEFAULTS REMAINS UNCLEAR, BUT DISCLOSURE OF RISKS TO BORROWERS COULD BE IMPROVED, 
(Sept. 20, 2006); Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 
58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006). 
38 See Michael Moss & Geraldine Fabrikant, Once Trusted Mortgage Pioneers, Now Pariahs, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (referring to option 
ARM loans as the “Typhoid Mary” of the mortgage industry). 
 2009] DELEVERAGING THE AMERICAN HOMEOWNER 1123 
threatened to prolong the foreclosure crisis, little was done in 2008 to 
restructure them on a sounder basis. 
E.  Other Modification Agreement Terms 
I obtained a small sample of 2008 mortgage modification documents 
from consumer attorneys and housing counselors.39  Their provisions were 
consistent with the empirical evidence; they illustrated the capitalizing of 
unpaid amounts, sometimes reducing interest rates to as low as 3%, but 
often leaving them at 6% to 7%.  Only one, a Litton modification, 
cancelled any debt (interest and expenses, not principal).  The remainder 
all involved capitalization of arrears and a resulting increase in total debt.  
When payment reductions were achieved, it was with a combination of 
term extensions (some to 40 years), rate reductions and balloon payments. 
The modification form agreements vary from servicer to servicer; no 
industry standard form has emerged.  One form included an atypical 
reverter clause, providing that if the borrower fails to make payments 
under the modified term for 90 days, the modified terms are canceled and 
the mortgage reverts to its original terms.  While there have been reports of 
servicers using modification agreements as a means to obtain releases of 
potential consumer claims, only one of the 2008 forms I reviewed included 
broad releases, in the form of an agreement by the borrower that there are 
no defenses, counterclaims or rights of set-off to the note.  Another 
modification from May 2008 did include a provision that the borrower 
would agree to cooperate in signing replacement loan documents including 
lost notes.  This clause presumably deals with the common problem with 
securitized mortgages, leading some courts to refuse to allow foreclosure 
based on lack of standing or failure to state a claim.40 
Another modification provided for the borrower to pay modification 
fees of $500, which was added to the borrower’s balance.  Several 
modifications included the addition of attorney fees and costs rolled into 
the balance.  This is troubling in light of Professor Kathleen Porter’s 
study.41  In a survey of mortgage servicer claims filed in bankruptcy, Porter 
found that more than 20% of the arrears amounts were servicer, attorney 
fees and foreclosure costs, and that the median amount claimed was 
                                                                                                                          
39 The modifications referred to in the following section are on file with the author. 
40 E.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (noting that a 
plaintiff’s failure to prove that he or she had standing when the foreclosure complaint was filed will 
result in a dismissal without prejudice until plaintiff is able to establish standing requirements at a 
future date). 
41 Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
121 (2008). 
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$1857.42  Her research also found that servicers did not adequately itemize 
these amounts or provide supporting documentation, leading to the 
inference that some of these amounts may be excessive or unearned.43 
In short, the typical voluntary modifications of 2008 were not unlike 
the subprime loan originations they were meant to resolve: borrowers were 
kept in debt exceeding home values and exceeding their ability to amortize, 
with deferrals of interest, balloon payments, and temporary low interest 
rates.  Nontraditional mortgages were not consistently converted to safer, 
fixed-rate amortizing loans.  Meanwhile, many mortgages that were not 
restructured languish in limbo, neither modified nor foreclosed. 
V.  REPERFORMANCE AND REDEFAULT 
Another aspect of the failure of the voluntary mortgage modification 
process has been the high level of “redefaults” on modified mortgages, i.e. 
modifications that are followed by further payment delinquencies.44  The 
redefault problem has resulted in criticism of the very idea of modifying 
mortgage loans.45  On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that 
more aggressive modifications, especially those that reduce the principal 
debt, are much less subject to high rates of redefault.46 
I separately examined 3,517 mortgages modified in the January 2008 
Columbia Collateral file that still appeared in the November 2008 file.47  
Overall, 53% were current or due for the current month’s payment, and 
19% were more than 180 days delinquent.  On the other hand, only 17% 
were in bankruptcy or foreclosure, and 3% were in REO, so most modified 
mortgages remained active accounts ten months after modification. 
Redefaults were worse than the national average in California, Florida, 
Arizona and Nevada, where property values have declined significantly.  
Redefaults were lower than the national average for the hard-hit industrial 
                                                                                                                          
42 Katherine Porter, Presentation at the University of Iowa Subprime Housing Crisis Symposium: 
Falling Further: Default Costs in Home Foreclosures, at slide 6 (Oct. 11, 2008), available at 
http://ppc.uiowa.edu/SubprimePresentations/KatherinePorter.pdf. 
43 Porter, supra note 41, at 152–61. 
44 See Charles Duhigg, Fighting Foreclosures, F.D.I.C. Chief Draws Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 
2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (noting statement by Comptroller of the 
Currency that more than half of mortgages modified by national banks were delinquent again after six 
months). 
45 See Sheila Bair, Sheila Bair’s Mortgage Miracle, WALL ST. J, Dec. 3, 2008, at A16, available 
at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (“Infuriated at the difficulty of modifying mortgages, the 
Beltway crowd doesn’t understand that such contracts weren’t designed to let people live in houses 
they can’t afford.”). 
46 MERRILL LYNCH, LOAN MODIFICATIONS:  WHAT INVESTORS NEED TO KNOW, (Nov. 21, 2008); 
CREDIT SUISSE, SUBPRIME LOAN MODIFICATIONS UPDATE 6 (Oct. 1, 2008); LEHMAN BROTHERS, THE 
LOAN MODIFICATION STORY SO FAR (Sep. 11, 2008).   
47 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing the Columbia Collateral file).  There 
were originally 3,639, with the difference representing prepayments and liquidated foreclosures. 
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states like Ohio and Michigan.48  This suggests that the extent of negative 
home equity may play a greater role than unemployment and economic 
distress. 
Redefaults also varied somewhat among different servicers.  
Countrywide’s modified loans performed worse than the average, with 
52% more than sixty days past due, while Litton had 45% of modified 
loans more than sixty days past due.  This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that more aggressive modifications are more likely to be successful, 
although these differences are not dramatic. 
Different types of modifications are expected to have different 
redefault rates.  This did not appear to be the case with the January 2008 
modifications, although data limitations may explain the results.  Only five 
of the 3,634 January modifications involved any substantial write-off of 
principal or interest, so there was no useful data on the performance of 
modifications with principal write-downs.  Comparing modifications that 
reduced payments with those that increased payments, there were 
surprisingly minimal differences in the delinquency status of modified 
loans.  About 48% of modified loans were sixty days or more past due, 
whether the modified payment had been lower, higher, or the same as 
before the modification.  Those modifications that capitalized more than 
$10,000 in past-due interest and fees had a sixty-day default rate of about 
50%, and 17% foreclosures, compared with 47% sixty-day defaults and 
14% foreclosures for modifications with minimal or no capitalization 
(negative prepayment less than $1,000).  
Loans originated in 2004 and 2005 had better reperformance rates 
(58% current or thirty-days past due) than loans originated in 2006 (45%) 
and 2007 (only 40% current or thirty-days past due).   Not surprisingly, 
FICO scores at origination were correlated with reperformance:  48% of 
borrowers with scores below 550 were delinquent versus 37% of borrowers 
with FICO scores above 700. 
Another factor that has been identified as predictive of redefault rates 
for modified loans is whether the loan was delinquent or current before 
being modified.  Most of the mortgages modified in November had been 
delinquent in October before being modified (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4 October Status of Mortgages Modified in November 2008 
 Days Past Due Percent 
Current 4,368 20.6 
30 days 2,492 11.8 
60 days 1,884 8.9 
                                                                                                                          
48 Sixty-day or more delinquent modified loans were 47% of all modified loans, compared with 
52% for Arizona, 57% in California, 54% in Florida and 57% in Nevada. 
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90 days 1,895 8.9 
120 days 4,118 19.4 
>180 days 6,427 30.3 
Total 21,184 100 
 
On the other hand, only one in five modified loans had been in 
foreclosure prior to modification (see Table 5). 
 
 
Table 5 October file status of November file mods  
 
Modified mortgages that were current (or not seriously delinquent) 
when modified were must less likely to default again than modified 
mortgages that were in serious default before being modified.49  Loans 
modified before default were more likely to involve conversion of an 
adjustable-rate mortgage to a fixed rate to prevent a sharp payment 
increase.50  These rate reset modifications represent the single category in 
which servicers engaged in preventive loan restructuring, largely as a result 
of the December 2007 HOPE NOW rate freeze initiative.51 
It is now apparent that mortgage modifications will succeed in 
achieving sustainable repayment and in reducing the aggregate debt 
overhang, but only if they include reductions of principal to align debt with 
property values, are permanent and fully amortizing, and are negotiated as 
early as possible in the delinquency, or even before a delinquency occurs.  
On the other hand, continuation of the existing model will simply defer 
additional accumulated mortgage debt into 2009 and beyond, further 
prolonging the foreclosure crisis. 
                                                                                                                          
49 CREDIT SUISSE, supra note 46, at 6; LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 46, at 2, 4. 
50 CREDIT SUISSE, supra note 46, at 6; LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 46, at 2, 4. 
51 See Edmund L. Andrews, Mortgage Aid, Within Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at A1, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (noting that the Greenlining Institute estimated that only 
12% of subprime borrowers would benefit from the rate freeze). 
 Frequency 
Valid 
Percent 
No action 15,904 75.1 
Bankruptcy 191 0.9 
Loss Mitigation 570 2.7 
Foreclosure 4,123 19.5 
REO 396 1.9 
Total 21,184 100 
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VI.  WHY ARE VOLUNTARY MORTGAGE MODIFICATIONS FAILING AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
Mortgage servicing agents have thus far failed to modify mortgages in 
ways that would clearly reduce investor losses for their principals.  The 
reasons for this failure are multiple and complex.  They include contractual 
limitations, economic incentives, reliance on outdated cash flow models, 
and industry culture.  Servicers face a variety of incentives and obstacles in 
their efforts to maximize return for investors and keep their costs down.  
Some have argued that servicers profit when more borrowers default and 
go into foreclosure.52  The reality is somewhat more complex than that. 
Mortgage servicer compensation (for securitized mortgages) is 
governed by pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs).  Servicers receive 
income from a fixed portion of monthly interest payments actually 
received, from late fees and other default charges, and from the interest on 
funds held for investors or escrow.53  On the other hand, servicers typically 
must advance interest to investors when the borrower does not make a 
payment.54  They also advance funds to third parties, like lawyers, during 
the foreclosure process.  The servicer recovers its advances only when the 
borrower eventually brings payments current or when a foreclosure sale is 
completed.  In either case the servicer is entitled to recover its advances 
before turning over the balance to investors.  Thus, if a foreclosure sale 
yields only 25% of the total amount due then the servicer still recovers 
100% of interest advances and other advances from the sale proceeds, 
                                                                                                                          
52 Posting of Katie Porter to Credit Slips, http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/05/piling-on-
fees.html (May 16, 2008, 5:56 EST). 
53 See, e.g., Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Series 2005-W5, among Argent Securities, 
Depositor, Ameriquest Mortgage Company, Master Servicer, and Deutsche Bank National Trust 
Company, Trustee, § 3.18, Dec. 1, 2005, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1346253/000088237706000099/d406287_ex4-1.htm (describing a typical pooling and servicing 
agreement for a subprime mortgage pool). 
The compensation provision is as follows:  
As compensation for the activities of the Master Servicer hereunder, the Master Servicer shall be 
entitled to the Servicing Fee with respect to each Mortgage Loan payable solely from payments of 
interest in respect of such Mortgage Loan, subject to Section 4.03(e).  In addition, the Master Servicer 
shall be entitled to recover unpaid Servicing Fees out of Insurance Proceeds, Subsequent Recoveries or 
Liquidation Proceeds to the extent permitted by Section 3.05(a) (ii), out of general funds in the 
Collection Account to the extent permitted by Section 3.05(a) and out of amounts derived from the 
operation and sale of an REO Property to the extent permitted by Section 3.13.  The right to receive the 
Servicing Fee may not be transferred in whole or in part except in connection with the transfer of all of 
the Master Servicer’s responsibilities and obligations under this Agreement. 
Additional servicing compensation in the form of assumption fees, late payment charges, 
insufficient funds fees, reconveyance fees and other similar fees and charges (other than Prepayment 
Charges) shall be retained by the Master Servicer only to the extent such amounts, fees or charges are 
received by the Master Servicer.  The Master Servicer shall also be entitled pursuant to Section 
3.05(a)(vi) to withdraw from the Collection Account, pursuant to Section 3.04(h) to withdraw from any 
Escrow Account and pursuant to Section 3.13(b) to withdraw from any REO Account, as additional 
servicing compensation, interest or other income earned on deposits therein, subject to Section 3.06. 
Id. at § 3.05. 
54 See id. at § 4.03 (describing advances). 
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assuming they are sufficient to cover the advances.  On the other hand, if a 
delinquent mortgage is modified, then the servicer will not recover the 
advances made to investors on that account until the borrower repays the 
servicer.  This is particularly problematic for the servicer when the 
advances are deferred in a balloon payment due in thirty years. 
A servicer faced with a delinquent mortgage thus is faced with an 
immediate and ongoing cash outflow of interest each month.  If the 
servicer forecloses, it will advance more money for legal fees but hope to 
recover its advances in the three to twelve months that it will take to 
foreclose and sell the property.  In that event, it will also recover some 
additional revenue from late fees once the sale is completed.  If the servicer 
modifies the mortgage, it will no longer be required to make new advances 
(if the borrower resumes and continues payments), but will have to wait a 
long time to recover prior advances, unless the homeowner makes a cash 
payment at the time of the modification.  This is why many servicers insist 
on at least recovering attorney fees advanced before modifying a mortgage.  
In an environment where financial institutions that service mortgages are 
concerned about cash flow, it is apparent why they might prefer to 
foreclose: to recover past advances rather than gamble on modifications.  
To put it another way, the investor losses may be very large, but the 
servicer will almost always benefit by completing a foreclosure sale. 
Some PSAs delegate broad discretion to servicers to modify mortgage 
terms, including reductions of interest rate or principal debt,55 while others 
provide no such discretion or authority at all.56  In the latter case, the 
rigidity of the servicer-investor contract prevents any flexibility in 
modifying the mortgage loan contract.  The PSA itself can usually be 
modified, but only with the consent of a supermajority of investors, a 
necessarily cumbersome process.  The widely publicized suit by investors 
against mortgage servicer Countrywide was based on a PSA that did not 
permit modifications, unless the servicer repurchased the mortgage loans 
before modifying them.57 
Even if a servicer is not restricted by the PSA and is willing to defer 
recovery of prior advances, it will not modify a mortgage unless it believes 
that the modification will produce a greater present value (or smaller loss), 
given the risks, than immediate foreclosure.  Servicers model the costs and 
benefits of modifications by comparing the net present value of projected 
                                                                                                                          
55 Id. at § 302. 
56 See, e.g., Sale and Servicing Agreement, Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2006-1, Saxon Asset 
Securities Trust 2006-1, Issuer, Saxon Asset Securities Company, Depositor, Saxon Funding 
Management, Inc., Master Servicer, Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc., Servicer, and Deutsche Bank Trust 
Company Americas, Indenture Trustee, Apr. 1, 2006, available at http://idea.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/1361039/000116231806000629/exhibit991.htm. 
57 Vikas Bajaj, Fund Investors Sue Countrywide Over Loan Modifications, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 
2008, at B8, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
 2009] DELEVERAGING THE AMERICAN HOMEOWNER 1129 
cash flow from a modified mortgage with the projected present value of a 
foreclosure sale recovery.58  These present value models rely on a large 
number of assumptions, often based on history of past performance.  One 
factor, for example, is the projected redefault rate.  If a servicer has a 
history of 50% or more redefaults, its present value model will predict 
lower cash flow from modified mortgages than if a lower redefault rate is 
assumed.  Likewise, servicers have to estimate loss severities on future 
foreclosures.59  If they use historical data, servicers are likely to 
underestimate loss severities and thus tip the scales in favor of foreclosure 
and against modification. 
Finally, some very practical realities are preventing both the number 
and depth of mortgage modifications needed.  Servicers are overwhelmed60 
and faced with a rapidly changing political and legal environment.  Past 
habits and groupthink probably play some role in the reluctance to engage 
in modifications differently than in the past.  New initiatives are announced 
by federal agencies monthly, and servicers understandably do not want to 
start writing down loans after a taxpayer-funded bailout program.61  These 
are just some of the factors that have led to the present impasse. 
To get out of the impasse, the mortgage industry needs a coordinated 
set of policies that will discourage wasteful foreclosures while offering 
clear guidance on how and when to make aggressive and permanent 
adjustments to failing mortgage loan contracts.  The lessons of 2007 and 
2008 can be put to good use if the empirical evidence is used to build 
better models of the costs and benefits of modifications and foreclosures.  
The federal government, as de facto owner of various failed or failing 
financial institutions and manager of the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac 
portfolio of mortgages, is in the best position to establish clear objectives 
for the restructuring of America’s mortgage debt. Successful restructuring 
would include the reduction of debt to levels that correspond to stable 
home values and to the ability of homeowners to repay. 
A successful comprehensive set of policies should include the 
following.  First, the program must include some form of foreclosure 
moratorium or selective postponement for the maximum number of 
                                                                                                                          
58 AMERICAN SECURITIZATION FORUM, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
GUIDELINES FOR THE MODIFICATION OF SECURITIZED SUBPRIME RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS 3–4 
(2007), available at http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF%20Subprime %20 
Loan%20Modification%20Principles_060107.pdf. 
59 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., WORKOUT PROGRAM GUIDELINES NET PRESENT VALUE 
WORKSHEET (2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/loans/loanmod/NPV.xls; MOODY’S 
INVESTOR SERVICES, THE IMPACT OF THE FDIC’S AND FHA’S MORTGAGE LOAN RESCUE PROGRAM 
ON U.S. RMBS LOSS EXPECTATIONS (2008) (giving examples of present value assumptions for 
comparing loan modifications and foreclosure losses).  
60 See supra note 32 (discussing the high volume of foreclosures and servicer response). 
61 See Charles Duhigg, Fighting Foreclosures, F.D.I.C. Chief Draws Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 
2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (discussing proposal to provide government 
insurance for modified mortgages). 
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salvageable mortgages.  While Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announced a 
six-week holiday moratorium on November 20, 2008,62 a freeze on 
foreclosures needs to last long enough to allow the existing inventory of 
foreclosed homes to be sold in an orderly fashion without continually 
swelling the inventory.  A freeze also needs to allow a genuine and 
comprehensive mortgage restructuring to be implemented nationwide, a 
process that could certainly take twelve months or more.  A moratorium or 
delay would obviously need to exclude vacant properties and loans to 
borrowers whose income is clearly inadequate to repay any conceivable 
modified mortgage. 
In conjunction with the postponement of avoidable foreclosures, the 
federal banking agencies, including the FDIC and Treasury, must 
continually reevaluate and improve the FDIC’s current standardized 
approach to mortgage modifications, and deal with the principal debt 
reduction issue.  The standardized approach to modifying loans should be 
applied across the board to all federally-owned mortgages and be mandated 
for financial institutions receiving any of the various forms of federal aid.63  
Allowing bankruptcy courts to impose mortgage modifications, including 
principal reductions to align debt with home values, would be a useful 
step.64  On the other hand, the cost of bankruptcy, including legal fees, is 
high for debtors,65 and bankruptcy modifications should not be viewed as a 
substitute for systematic mortgage restructuring outside of bankruptcy. 
The FDIC and other federal agencies should also lead the way by 
offering any homeowner with negative equity a principal reduction to be 
replaced by a balloon payment that automatically declines by 20% per year 
and is reduced to zero after five years.  The existing program, consisting of 
offering principal deferrals only when needed to reduce payment burdens 
without any hope of permanent debt cancellation, fails to offer 
homeowners necessary incentives to continue repaying their debt. 
Less attractive solutions would include purchases by the Treasury 
Department of delinquent mortgages at par or some negotiated discount, 
followed by a restructuring and principal reduction similar to what was 
done by the Homeowners Loan Corporation in the 1930s.  This would shift 
the losses investors would otherwise bear to the taxpayer.  The government 
did not insure mortgage-backed securities, and investors’ risks were 
                                                                                                                          
62 Zachary A. Goldfarb, Fannie, Freddie Halt Foreclosures for Holidays, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 
2008, at D1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File. 
63 Ralph Vartabedian, Federal Bank Bailout Isn’t Trickling Down, Panel Told, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
17, 2008, at A13, available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File. 
64 Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 
2009 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071931. 
65 Michelle J. White & Ning Zhu, Saving Your Home in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 5, 24–25 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14179, 2008), available at http://www.econ.ucsd.edu/ 
~miwhite/white-zhu-nber14179.pdf. 
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described in detail in the securitization documents.  There is no reason that 
investors should not accept the smaller losses of systemic restructuring, 
given that they otherwise face the larger (uninsured) losses of massive 
foreclosures. 
FDIC Chair Sheila Bair’s proposal to insure modified loans against 
further default under certain circumstances might offer servicers an 
incentive to modify mortgages more aggressively.66  On the other hand, 
this proposal amounts to a contingent taxpayer bailout and suffers from the 
drawback that servicers are likely to adversely select the riskiest 
modifications to include in the insurance program. 
A genuine solution to the foreclosure crisis must involve a range of 
initiatives, all aimed at bringing existing mortgage debt down to 
sustainable levels.  The only other option is to continue relying on 
voluntary industry efforts while waiting for a housing market recovery, 
essentially the Federal government’s response through the end of 2008.  
Although banks have written down billions in assets and restored some 
capital, borrowers are still crushed by the burden of mortgage debt.  Their 
continuing struggle is measured in the ever-growing inventory of homes 
acquired by mortgage servicers at foreclosure sales that remain unsold, the 
pending foreclosures that are not going to sale, and in the hundreds of 
thousands of families who are stumbling along in informal forbearance or 
in modification agreements that defer and increase their debt. 
                                                                                                                          
66 See Bair, supra note 45 (discussing modification of more than two million loans). 
